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The Usefulness of Fair Values in Improving the Predictive Ability of 
Earnings: Evidence from International Banks  
 
 
 
Abstract 
One of the objectives of general-purpose financial reporting is to provide information 
about the financial position, financial performance and cash flows of an entity that is 
useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions. The current focus on 
potentially increased relevance of fair value accounting weighed against issues of 
reliability has failed to consider the potential impact on the predictive ability of 
accounting. Based on a sample of international (non-U.S.) banks from 24 countries 
during 2009-2012, we test the usefulness of fair values in improving the predictive 
ability of earnings. First, we find that the increasing use of fair values on 
balance-sheet financial instruments enhances the ability of current earnings to predict 
future earnings and cash flows. Second, we provide evidence that the fair value 
hierarchy classification choices affect the ability of earnings to predict future cash 
flows and future earnings. More precisely, we find that the non-discretionary fair 
value component (Level 1 assets) improves the predictability of current earnings 
whereas the discretionary fair value components (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) weaken 
the predictive power of earnings. Third, we find a consistent and strong association 
between factors reflecting country-wide institutional structures and predictive power 
of fair values based on discretionary measurement inputs (Level 2 and Level 3 assets 
and liabilities). Our study is timely and relevant. The findings have important 
implications for standard setters and contribute to the debate on the use of fair value 
accounting. 
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1. Introduction 
A major feature of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is the use 
of fair value accounting for financial assets and liabilities. Since the global financial 
crisis (GFC), considerable debate has focused on fair value accounting for financial 
assets in the banking industry (Barth and Landsman, 2010; Landsman, 2007; Laux 
and Leuz, 2009). The current debate about fair value accounting versus historical cost 
accounting mainly revolves around the traditional divergence between relevance and 
reliability. One of the objectives of general-purpose financial reporting, according to 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Conceptual Framework, ‘is to 
provide information about the financial position, financial performance and cash 
flows of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions 
(Paragraph 12, IASB Conceptual Framework)’. The useful and reliable financial 
information helps investors to assess the amounts, timing and uncertainty of the 
entity’s future cash flows. Proponents of fair value assert that fair values are relevant 
for financial decision making. Early studies provide supporting evidence that fair 
value disclosure of financial instruments (Barth, 1994; Petroni and Wahlen, 1995; 
Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; Carroll et al., 2003; Venkatachalam, 1996; Barth, 
1991; Amir, 1993) and revalued financial, tangible, and intangible assets are value 
relevant (Barth and Clinch, 1998; Aboody et al., 1999). 
There is a stream of studies that investigates the usefulness of accounting 
information in forecasting future cash flows. Those studies have concentrated on the 
relative predicative ability of aggregate earnings and earnings components from 
non-financial firms (Bowen et al., 1986; Dechow et al., 1998; Subramanyam and 
Venkatachalam, 2007; Barth et al., 2001; Farshadfar and Monem, 2013; Cheng and 
Hollie, 2008). However, there are limited studies (Chen et al., 2006; Hill, 2009; Evans 
et al., 2014; Bratten et al., 2014) that investigate the predictive ability of fair value 
information for future earnings and cash flows. Proponents of fair value accounting 
uphold that fair values are capable of predicting future cash flows because they reflect 
up-to-date market conditions. Also, unrealised gains and losses of certain financial 
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assets can be converted to realised gains and losses when those financial assets are 
sold (Bratten et al., 2014). Therefore, the fair values of those financial assets can be 
linked to the entity’s future performance (Evans et al., 2014). Moreover, recent 
bank-related studies generally confirm that managers use the discretion provided by 
fair value accounting to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 1995; Hodder et al., 2006; Li 
and Sloan, 2014) which in turn increases earnings persistence and earnings 
informativeness (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006).  
Critics have concerns about the negative impact of fair value accounting on the 
ability of earnings to predict future performance. Opponents of fair value accounting 
argue that accounting estimates based on fair values are more volatile than those based on 
historical cost (Barth, 1995; Hodder et al., 2006), making it harder to predict future 
performance. In addition, fair values can be subjectively determined by managers 
especially when capital markets are illiquid (Level 3 assets). The measurement errors 
would adversely affect relevance and reliability of discretionary fair values and thereby 
reduce the ability of earnings to predict future performance. Given the continued debate 
surrounding the merits of fair value accounting, we investigate whether a bank’s 
exposure to fair value accounting in financial instruments
1
 enhances the ability of 
earnings to predict future cash flows and future earnings.  
  We also examine the impact of fair value hierarchy classification choices on the 
ability of earnings to predict future cash flows and future earnings. More precisely, we 
investigate if the usefulness of fair values in improving the predictive ability of 
earnings differs between non-discretionary fair value components (Level 1 assets) and 
discretionary fair value components (Level 2 and Level 3 assets). As part of its 
response to the GFC and the convergence project between IFRS and the United States 
(U.S.), in March 2009 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
issued Improving Disclosures about Financial Instruments (Amendments to IFRS 7 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures). IFRS 7 now requires reporting entities to 
                                                             
1
 We measure the bank’s exposure to fair value accounting as the percentage of fair valued financial 
instruments over total assets. Since a bank’s balance sheet consists mostly of financial instruments, this 
measurement will efficiently capture the banks’ on balance-sheet exposure to fair value accounting. 
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disclose the fair values based on a ‘Three-Level’ hierarchy in order to provide 
financial statement users with useful information about valuations, methodologies and 
the uncertainty associated with fair value measurements. Level 1 and Level 2 
measurements
2
 include observable and indirectly observable inputs such as quoted 
prices of identical or comparable assets or liabilities from active markets. However, 
Level 3 measurements include unobservable inputs computed by using price models 
or discounted cash flow methodologies or other information reflecting the reporting 
entity’s own assumptions and judgments. Therefore, Level 3 inputs are subject to the 
highest degree of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry can either enhance 
or reduce the predictive power of Level 3 assets and liabilities. On the one hand, 
discretionary fair values could provide irrelevant information for future cash flows if 
managers use the discretion available under Level 3 assets opportunistically to 
manipulate earnings. Alternatively, management may use the discretionary fair values 
(Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities) as a way to signal to investors their 
expectations about future cash flows, enhancing the predictive power of those 
accounting information. 
Last, we test whether the predictive ability of discretionary fair values (Level 2 
and Level 3 assets and liabilities) of banks is associated with the strength of 
institutional structures. Strong institutional structures will limit insiders’ ability to 
acquire private control benefits which improves the reliability of fair value accounting 
information. Consequently, the predictive power of those discretionary fair value 
measurements (Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities) will be enhanced. 
Based on a sample of international (non-U.S.) banks from 24 countries during 
2009-2012, the findings can be summarised as follows. First, we find that the 
increasing use of fair values on balance-sheet financial instruments enhances the 
ability of earnings to predict future earnings and future cash flows (measured as one 
                                                             
2
 The distinctive difference between Level 2 inputs and Level 3 inputs is whether inputs are observable. 
However, Level 2 fair values are also discretionary, although they are considered to be more reliable 
than Level 3 assets, because they are determined by indirect inputs such as yield curves, exchange rates 
and empirical correlations which involves the managerial discretion. 
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year ahead). Specifically, for banks that report a greater proportion of their financial 
instruments at fair value, earnings before taxes exhibit a stronger positive association 
with future earnings and future cash flows. Second, we provide evidence that there is 
a distinctive difference between non-discretionary fair value (Level 1 assets) and 
discretionary fair value (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) with respect of their usefulness in 
improving the predictability of earnings. Specifically, results show that net Level 1 
assets enhance earnings persistence and the ability of current earnings to predict 
future cash flows. Whereas, discretionary fair values based on managerial 
assumptions (net Level 2 and net Level 3 assets) are found to weaken the predictive 
power of current earnings with respect to future earnings/cash flows. Third, we find a 
consistent and strong association between factors reflecting country-wide institutional 
structures and predictive power of fair values based on discretionary measurement 
inputs (Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities). We provide evidence that Level 2 
and Level 3 assets and liabilities can enhance the ability of earnings to predict future 
earnings and future cash flows only when institutional structures are strong. These 
results provide supporting evidence that international institutional factors enhance 
earnings persistence and the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows in banks. 
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the 
ongoing debate about the merits of a fair value accounting-based reporting system. 
Prior research has primarily focused on examining the value relevance of fair value 
estimates. However, those studies do not provide direct evidence on whether fair 
values improve the predictability of earnings (Barth, 2006). Therefore, this study 
complements value relevance studies as it provides direct evidence of whether fair 
value estimates influence the ability of current earnings to predict future performance. 
Second, there is limited research examining the differences between alternative fair 
value measurement inputs in terms of their predictive ability for future cash flows and 
earnings. The results of those studies are mixed. Ehalaiye (2014) provides strong 
evidence that there is a predictive relationship between Level 1 and Level 2 bank fair 
values and future operating cash flows. However, the Level 3 fair values of such 
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banks in most cases were not significantly associated with the banks’ future quarterly 
operating cash flows. In contrast, from a sample of agricultural firms listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), He et al. (2010) find that fair value earnings based 
on the ‘model’ (Level 3) has explanatory power while fair value earnings based on the 
‘market’ (Levels 1 and Level 2) has no explanatory power for future cash flows. Our 
study contributes to the literature by providing further evidence on the differences in 
the predictive power between alternative fair value measurement inputs from an 
international context.  
Third, we extend prior research on the international institutional factors that 
influence the financial reporting behavior of banks. Recent studies that examine the 
association between fair value accounting and the ability of earnings to predict future 
cash flows/earnings in banks have been undertaken in a specific country context (U.S 
and Australia)
3
. However, the reliability and accuracy of fair value measurements 
varies with the liquidity of capital markets. For example, Level 2 and Level 3 assets 
are generally considered to be less reliable than Level 1 assets given they are 
subjectively measured based on managerial models and assumptions. We provide 
additional evidence that international institutional factors enhance the ability of 
discretionary fair value measurements (Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities) to 
predict future cash flows and earnings in banks. These results have important 
implications for standard setters. That is, a fair value based accounting system 
enhances earnings persistence and the ability to predict future cash flows. Moreover, 
this study reinforces the evidence (Ball, 2006) already available that adoption of 
uniform accounting standards, without considering the institutional features, will not 
be able to significantly improve accounting quality or enhance the usefulness of 
accounting information. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
institutional background. Section 3 reviews relevant prior research and develops 
                                                             
3
 See Chen et al. (2006), Hill (2009), He et al. (2010), Ehalaiye (2014), Bratten et al. (2014) and 
Evans et al. (2013). 
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hypotheses. Section 4 explains the research design, including the models, 
measurement of variables and the sample selection procedures. Section 5 presents the 
analysis of the results while Section 6 provides concluding comments. 
 
 
2. Institutional Background 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) began its work on 
financial instruments in 1988 and the subject has remained on the active international 
standard-setting agenda ever since. The IASC released International Accounting 
Standard 32 (IAS 32) Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation in 1995. 
This was an initial standard dealing with the presentation and disclosure issues on 
financial instruments. After a prolonged period of increased effort, IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was issued in 1999 to deal with the 
recognition and other measurement issues that were covered in IAS 32. In 2002, in 
response to practice issues identified in the IAS 39 implementation guidance process 
by audit firms, national standard setters, regulators and others, the IASB proposed 
changes to both IAS 32 and IAS 39. It issued revised versions of those standards in 
December 2003. In August 2005, the IASB expanded the disclosure aspects of IAS 32 
and IAS 39 by issuing IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, incorporating the 
disclosure requirements of FAS 157 in the U.S.  
Fair value, under IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement
4
 is defined as ‘the price that 
would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly 
transaction between market participants at the measurement date.’ The definition 
emphasizes that fair value is more a market-based measurement than an 
entity-specific measurement. Thus, fair values may be determined based on the 
                                                             
4  IFRS 13 seeks to increase consistency and comparability in fair value measurements and 
related disclosures through a 'fair value hierarchy'. The hierarchy categorises the inputs used in 
valuation techniques into three levels. The hierarchy gives the highest priority to (unadjusted) quoted 
prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities and the lowest priority to unobservable inputs. 
[IFRS 13:72] 
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assumptions that market participants would use in valuing the asset or liability. 
As noted, IFRS7 requires reporting entities to disclose fair values based on a 
Three-Level measurement hierarchy. While Level 1 measurement includes observable 
inputs such as quoted prices of identical assets or liabilities from active markets, 
Level 2 measures include indirectly observable inputs such as quoted prices of 
comparable assets and liabilities from active markets. However, there can be two 
sub-classes of Level 2 inputs. Ryan (2008, p.29) states: ‘The first subclass is quoted 
market prices from similar assets traded in active markets. These measurements are 
considered to be less ideal than Level 1 inputs but still reliable as they are based on 
observable inputs which are less subjective. The second subclass is indirect inputs 
such as yield curves, exchange rates and empirical correlations. The second subclass 
input has lower quality than the first subclass of Level 2 inputs but is of higher quality 
than Level 3 inputs’.  
The far less precise Level 3 measures include unobservable inputs computed by 
using price models or discounted cash flow methodologies or other information 
reflecting the reporting entity’s own assumptions and judgments. These inputs 
provide greater opportunity for management manipulation, and involve more 
information risks to financial statement users. The IASB limits the use of Level 3 
inputs to those situations when Level 1 and Level 2 measurements are not available. 
As fair value estimates based on Level 3 inputs are subject to a lot of estimations, 
IFRS 7 requires additional disclosures in relation to these assets and liabilities. 
Specifically, for fair value measurements in Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, 
entities need a reconciliation from the beginning balances to the ending balances, 
disclosing separately changes during the period attributable to the following: (a) total 
gains or losses for the period recognised in profit or loss, and a description of where 
they are presented in the statement(s) of profit or loss and other comprehensive 
income; (b) purchases, sales, issues and settlements (each type of movement disclosed 
separately); and (c) transfers into or out of Level 3 (for example, transfers attributable 
to changes in the observability of market data) and the reasons for those transfers. In 
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addition, for fair value measurements in Level 3, if changing one or more of the 
inputs to reasonably possible alternative assumptions would change fair value 
significantly, the entity shall state that fact and disclose the effect of those changes. 
The entity shall disclose how the effect of a change to a reasonably possible 
alternative assumption was calculated (Level 3 sensitivity analysis).  
Most recently, IFRS 13, Fair Value Measurement (IASB, 2011) is proposed as a 
product of the joint IASB/FASB harmonisation project. This standard has effectively 
commenced from 1 January 2013 and it replaces the fair value measurement guidance 
contained in individual IFRSs, including IAS 39, with a single framework for fair 
value measurement. It also expands and articulates in more detail the concepts and 
principles behind fair value, including the introduction of new concepts such as the 
‘principal market’ and also general descriptions of valuation approaches and 
techniques. IFRS 13 also aligns the fair value measurement regime with the FASB’s 
SFAS 157 (including the levels classification of estimation of fair value from level 1- 
active markets to level 3- based on models), emphasising the harmonisation project 
between the FASB and the IASB. 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Debate about the merits of fair values 
There has been a long-lived debate over fair value accounting. The current 
accounting literature shows that the debate about fair value accounting versus 
historical cost accounting mainly revolves around the traditional divergence between 
relevance
5
and reliability. Indeed, early studies primarily focus on the value relevance 
of fair value instruments (Barth, 1994; Petroni and Wahlen 1995; Barth et al., 1996; 
Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson 1996; Carroll et al., 2003; Schrand, 1997; Venkatachalam, 
                                                             
5
 Relevance is defined as ‘the quality of financial information which exists when that information 
influences decisions by users about the allocation of scarce resources by: (a) helping them form 
predictions about the outcomes of past, present or future events; and/or (b) confirming or correcting 
their past evaluations; and which enables users to assess the rendering of accountability preparers’ 
(Paragraph 5, International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Conceptual Framework)’.  
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1996; Barth, 1991; Amir, 1993). These studies generally confirm that fair value 
disclosures for financial instruments are value relevant. In addition, many papers have 
examined the market reactions to asset revaluations both in Australia (Barth and Clinch, 
1998) and in the United Kingdom (Aboody et al., 1999). The findings suggest revalued 
financial, tangible, and intangible assets are also value relevant.  
Fair value accounting serves as a way of presenting the financial statements in a 
‘true and fair’ way. However, historical cost accounting is often considered a more 
faithful representation because historical cost earnings are less subject to 
manipulation (Herrmann et al., 2006). Gains and losses on fair value estimates are 
based on appraisals or other valuation techniques. These techniques are subject to 
estimation and therefore provide managers with a tool for managing earnings 
(Dietrich et al., 2000). Another issue of reliability with fair values arises from 
measurement uncertainty. The fair value estimate is heavily reliant on valuation 
estimation models, which may result in intentional or unintentional bias. For example, 
Benston (2008, p. 106) claimed that ‘dishonest and opportunistic CFOs and CEOs are 
likely to find fair value accounting a boon to their efforts to manipulate reported net 
income’. Several empirical studies have evidenced deliberate managerial bias in fair 
value accounting (Dietrich et al., 2000; Hodder et al., 2006; Danbolt and Rees, 2008; 
Ramanna, 2008). In addition, previous studies have supported the argument that 
assessing the fair market value involves subjectivity. Hence, a high degree of 
judgment is required. Martin et al. (2006) find that preparers may easily be 
overconfident in their fair value judgments due to the amount of evidence they 
collected to develop their estimates. Additionally, there is a tendency for intentional 
bias in preparers’ estimates towards their preferred directions.  
3.2 The predictive ability of fair values 
Fair values are generally assumed to provide greater predictive value than historical 
cost measures for several reasons. First, fair values reflect current market conditions 
and capture the most informed expectations of future cash flows. In other words, the 
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changes in fair values should reflect the expectations about future cash flows and 
performance. Many papers have provided empirical evidence that asset revaluations, 
one use of fair value accounting, are associated with future cash flows and earnings 
(Barth and Clinch, 1998; Easton et al., 1993, Aboody et al., 1999). For example, 
based on sample data from UK firms, Aboody et al. (1999) find a significant positive 
relationship between upwards asset revaluations and changes in operating income and 
cash from operations. Jaggi and Tsui (2001) replicated the research of Aboody et al. 
(1999) using Hong Kong data and find that upward asset revaluation activities were 
significantly positively associated with firms’ future operating performance. This 
result suggests that firms had incentives to signal good news to potential investors by 
revaluing their assets to current market value.  
Second, proponents of fair value accounting assert that fair values of certain 
financial assets can help to predict a company’s future performance because the fair 
values impound expectations of future costs and benefits of holding these financial 
assets. For example, the unrealised gains or losses of those financial assets can be 
converted into realised cash flows and income when such assets are sold (for example, 
trading assets and certain derivatives are reported at fair value, with changes in fair 
value recognised in net income). Consistent with these expectations, Evans et al. 
(2014) investigate whether fair value information for interest-bearing investment 
securities is associated with future financial performance for a sample of commercial 
banks and whether the relative strength of this association is reflected in the relation 
between reported fair values and banks’ share prices. They find that banks’ 
accumulated fair value adjustments for investment securities are positively associated 
with future reported income from investment securities. 
The major criticism of fair value accounting is that it introduces higher volatility in 
the financial statements (Barth et al., 1995 and Hodder et al., 2006). Based on a 
survey of 401 financial executives, Graham et al. (2005) report that 97 percent of 
respondents express a preference for smooth earnings. Moreover, 80 percent of 
respondents express the belief that volatile earnings reduce predictive power. 
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Empirical studies have shown that earnings volatility reduces earnings predictability. 
For example, Dichev and Tang (2009) investigate the link between earnings volatility 
and earnings predictability. They find that low-volatility earnings have much higher 
persistence as compared to high-volatility earnings. They also find that earnings with 
low volatility have remarkably high persistence and high R-squares during the entire 
predictive horizon, while earnings with high volatility show quick reversion to the 
mean and little reliable predictability.  
Three U.S. studies examine the predictability of fair values on future cash flows 
and future earnings. Chen et al. (2006) predict that, if increased use of fair value 
accounting improves cash flow predictability, then a stronger association between 
current accounting data and future cash flows should be reflected in a higher R-square. 
However, their results fail to support this hypothesis. They show that, even with fair 
value requirements in recent standards, the correlation between current accounting 
numbers and current market data has not improved through time, nor has the 
correlation between current accounting numbers and future cash flows improved. 
Moreover, they find that the correlation between market data (in essence, fair value 
accounting) and future cash flows is significantly lower than the correlation between 
historical cost accounting and future cash flows. In other words, the use of fair value 
accounting reduces the predictive ability of financial reporting for future cash flows. 
They conclude that the current focus on potentially increased relevance (see Barth, 
1994; Petroni and Wahlen, 1995; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson 1996; 
Carroll et al., 2003; Schrand, 1997; Venkatachalam, 1996; Barth, 1991; Amir, 1993) 
weighed against issues of reliability has failed to consider the potential impact on the 
predictive ability of accounting.  
Hill (2009) examines how the implementation of SFAS 115 affects the ability of 
earnings to predict future cash flows. This study finds that fair value adjustments can 
improve the ability of annual earnings to predict future cash flows. However, the 
restricted population, time period and fair value application examined in this study 
limit its generalisability to broader populations, more volatile market conditions, and 
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more subjective applications of fair value valuation. Bratten et al. (2014) examine 
whether increased use of fair value estimates in financial reporting and the reliability of 
these estimates impacts the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows and future 
earnings. Using a sample of publicly traded and privately held bank holding companies, 
their study provides evidence that the extent of exposure to fair values6in financial 
reporting enhances the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows and future earnings 
in both public and private banks. They show that earnings under a more fair value-based 
reporting system are better predictors of future cash flows and future earnings when the 
reported fair value estimates are more reliable. Given the continued debate surrounding 
the merits of fair value accounting and conflicting results provided by prior studies, 
we present the first hypothesis in null form: 
Hypothesis 1a: Exposure to fair value accounting is unrelated to the ability of current 
earnings to predict future cash flows.  
Hypothesis 1b: Exposure to fair value accounting is unrelated to the ability of current 
earnings to predict future earnings.  
 
3.3 The predictive ability of alternative fair value measurement inputs 
As the ‘fair value hierarchy’ was first introduced in the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No.157 Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157) in 2006, most 
studies that examine alternative fair value measurement inputs are based on U.S. data. 
Those studies have concentrated on the value relevance and information risk of fair 
value estimates. For example, Riedl and Serafeim (201l) document a higher cost of 
capital for financial institutions with more Level 3 fair valued assets than Level 1 and 
Level 2 fair valued assets. They also find that the differences in cost of capital across 
the three levels of fair value assets are smaller for financial institutions which have 
better information environments. Liao et al. (2013) document a positive association 
between information asymmetry, measured by the bid-ask spread and both fair value 
                                                             
6
 Bretten et al. (2014) examine their research questions using two complementary and comprehensive 
approaches, a balance sheet and an income statement approach, to measure the extent to which fair 
values are used in financial reporting. 
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net assets and loan loss provisions during the financial crisis.  
There are two competing points of view regarding the predictive ability of Level 
1 versus Level 2 and Level 3 inputs. First, those who uphold fair values based on 
discretionary measurements inputs (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) believe that 
discretionary fair value estimates can provide incremental power to predict an entity’s 
future performance because management is in the best position to judge the amount, 
timing and risk of future cash flows (Ronen, 2008). Therefore, discretionary fair value 
estimates developed by inside managers can be a way of signaling management’s 
expectations of future cash flows (Barth, 2006). Moreover, fair value estimates based 
on market information (Level 1 assets) can be ‘noisy’ when capital markets are not 
perfect or information asymmetry exists (Whittington, 2008). 
 Second, from an agency theory perspective, measurement error and management 
bias in the determination of fair values, especially those fair value estimates for which 
input prices are indirectly observable (Level 2 assets) and unobservable (Level 3 
assets), can constrain the ability to predict future operating performance (Landsman, 
2007; Barth, 2006). Prior value relevance studies provide indirect evidence that fair 
value estimates are less likely to predict future performance in the presence of 
measurement error and bias. For example, Song et al. (2010) find that Level 1 fair 
values are more value relevant than Level 2 and Level 3 fair values. In addition, good 
corporate governance increases the value relevance of fair values, especially Level 3 
fair values. Their study suggests that Level 3 valuations are far less reliable than 
Level 1 and Level 2 valuations. 
  There is limited research examining the differences between alternative fair value 
measurement inputs in terms of their explanatory and predictive power for future cash 
flows and earnings. Using a sample of U.S. banks from 2008 to 2010, Ehalaiye (2014) 
provides the strong evidence that there is a predictive relationship between Level 1 
and Level 2 bank fair values and future operating cash flows. However, the Level 3 
net asset fair values in most cases were not significantly associated with the banks’ 
future quarterly operating cash flows. By contrast, from a sample of agricultural firms 
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listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), He et al. (2010) find that fair value 
earnings based on the ‘model’ (Level 3) has explanatory power while fair value 
earnings based on the ‘market’ (Levels 1 and Level 2) has no explanatory power for 
future cash flows. Furthermore, Bratten et al. (2014) show that earnings under a more 
fair value-based reporting system are better predictors of future cash flows and future 
earnings when the reported fair value estimates are more reliable. Based on the 
discussions in this section, we predict that fair values based on direct observable 
market inputs (Level 1 assets) are more reliable, thus, enhancing the earnings 
persistence and cash flow predictability. On the other hand, discretionary 
measurements that involve managerial discretion (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) weaken 
the predictive ability of current earnings for future cash flows and earnings. 
Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 2a: The Level 1 net assets of banks enhance earnings persistence and cash 
flow predictability. 
Hypothesis 2b: The Level 2 and Level 3 net assets of banks weaken earnings persistence 
and cash flow predictability. 
 
3.4 Institutional factors and the predictive ability of earnings 
An emerging literature investigates how institutional factors can affect the actual 
financial reporting incentives of financial statement preparers (Ball et al., 2000; Ball, 
et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Shen and Chih, 2005). This literature suggests that 
actual reporting behavior is endogenous because actual reporting incentives are 
determined in conjunction with the country’s real economic and political factors. 
Indeed, the demand for fair value and reliability of financial statements in common 
law countries can be different from the same demand in code law countries (Ball et al., 
2000).
7
 The results from LaPorta (1998) provide evidence that countries with English 
                                                             
7 Ball et al. (2006) summarise the distinct institutional features between common law countries and code law 
countries ‘Common law takes its name from the process whereby laws originate and arises from what is 
commonly accepted to be appropriate practice. Common law originated in England and spread to its former 
colonies such as US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Whereas, code law also takes its name from the process 
whereby laws, are ‘coded’ in the public sector. Code law originated in Continental Europe and spread to the 
former colonies of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Politically powerful stakeholder groups 
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common law legal systems tend to have: (1) better economic development and 
stronger capital markets, (2) stronger investor rights and (3) better legal enforcement 
than code law countries. 
The institutional differences between common-law and code-law countries in legal 
enforcement, economic development and investor protection have been applied in 
many recent accounting studies. The literature also suggests that institutional factors 
have a moderating effect on earnings management. For instance, Leuz et al. (2003) 
examine systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. They 
provide evidence that earnings management is decreasing in countries with strong 
investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private 
control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. The results 
suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported 
earnings. Similarly, Shen and Chih (2005) show that more than two-thirds of banks 
from 48 countries are found to have managed their earnings. In addition, they find 
that stronger protection of investors and greater transparency in accounting disclosure 
can reduce banks’ incentives to manage earnings. Also, market development, 
measured by real GDP per capital, decreases the degree of earnings management. 
Finally, stronger enforcement of laws can result in stronger earnings management. 
However, this effect appears in low-income countries only, and not in high-income 
countries. Based on a sample of firms from 42 countries, Francis and Wang (2008) 
find that earnings quality is higher in countries where investor protection is stronger. 
Prior research has also provided evidence that strong institutional structures also 
encourage more timely disclosure and greater transparency (Darrough and Stoughton, 
1990; Pagano and Volpin, 2005).  
From an agency theory perspective, fair value estimates are less likely to predict 
future performance in the presence of measurement error and bias (Level 2 and Level 
3 valuation inputs). Therefore, we predict that the strong institutional structures help 
                                                                                                                                                                              
necessarily are represented in both codifying and implementing rules in code law countries. Unlike code law, 
common law in its purest form makes standard-setting a private-sector responsibility’. 
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to increase the transparency and reliability of discretionary fair values (Level 2 and 
Level 3 assets), which in turn enhances the earnings persistence and cash flow 
predictability. Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 3: There is an association between factors reflecting country-wide 
institutional structures and predictive power of fair values based on discretionary 
measurement inputs (Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities). 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Models and measurement of variables 
We use the following models (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Altamuro and Beatty, 
2010) to test the predictive ability of more fair value-based earnings with respect to 
future earnings and future cash flows: 
EBTt+1 = α +β1EBTt+β2FVE t +β3 EBTt *FVE t + εt………………………………. (1)  
 
CFt+1 = α +β1EBTt+ β2FVEt ++ β3 EBTt*FVEt + εt ………………................………..(2) 
 
In model (1), the dependent variable, EBTt+1 is measured as earnings before taxes 
during the year t+1 scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. In model (2), 
the dependent variable, Cash Flows (CFt+1), is calculated as earnings before taxes and 
the loan loss provisions during the year t+1 scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the year. All independent variables are measured at time t to investigate whether 
current fair values improve the predictive ability of earnings about performance one 
year in the future. EBTt is earnings before taxes scaled by total assets at the beginning 
of the year.  
We measure a bank’s exposure to fair value accounting (FVEt) as the sum of net 
financial instruments recognised or disclosed at fair value divided by total assets. 
According to IAS 39- Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, fair 
valued financial instruments included in this measurement are financial assets or 
financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss, derivatives, loans and 
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receivables and available for sale financial assets. Although this measurement of fair 
value exposure (FVEt) includes some items that are not directly related to current 
period earnings
8
, these items are able to reflect future cash flows and performance. 
For example, trading securities can help to predict future interest revenue. Also 
realised and unrealised gains and losses on settlements of derivatives affect reported 
future earnings. As a result, the earnings of banks that are more exposed to fair value 
accounting are a better predictor of future cash flows and future earnings.  
In models (1) and (2), the coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction 
variable EBTt*FVEt, which is predicted to have a positive sign, consistent with the 
argument that the extent to which the financial instruments that are measured at fair value 
enhances earnings persistence and predictability of cash flows in banks. 
Using models (3) and (4), we test how the classification of fair values based on 
non-discretionary inputs (Level 1 net assets) and discretionary measurement inputs 
(Level 2 and Level 3 net assets) impact individually on the ability of current earnings 
to predict future earnings and cash flows (measured one year ahead).  
 
EBTt+1 = α +β1EBTt+β2L1t +β3L23t +β4L1t*EBTt + β5L23t*EBTt+εt……………….… (3) 
 
CFt+1 = α +β1EBTt+β2L1t +β3L23t +β4L1t*EBTt + β5L23t*EBTt+εt……………….... (4)  
 
The independent variables in models (3) and (4) are the percentage of net 
financial instruments valued using Level 1 (L1) versus Level 2 and Level 3 inputs 
(L23). Those variables are measured as net Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 fair value 
assets (fair values of assets minus fair values of liabilities) scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. In models (3) and (4), the coefficients of interest are β4 and β5, 
which are predicted to be positive and negative respectively, consistent with the 
prediction that non-discretionary fair values (Level 1) enhance the ability of earnings to 
                                                             
8
 Some assets are reported at fair value with changes in fair value recognised in net income, e.g., 
trading assets and certain derivatives. Some assets are measured at fair value with changes in fair value 
reported in equity, e.g., available-for-sale assets. 
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predict future performance whereas discretionary fair values (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) 
weaken the predictability of current earnings.  
Last, we investigate if there is an association between factors reflecting 
country-wide institutional structures and predictive power of fair values based on 
discretionary measurement inputs (Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities). We 
repeat the analysis from models (3) and (4) with two sub-samples partitioned by two 
clusters according to Leuz et al. (2003). 
All models are estimated as fixed effects models with year specific dummy 
variables to control for systematic time period effects and country dummies to 
provide additional controls for omitted variables. Also, we cluster the standard errors 
of sample banks to deal with the concerns arising from the use of panel data such as 
heteroscedasticity or serial correlation.  
 
4.2 Sample selection  
The original sample is obtained from the BANKSCOPE database, which comprises 
the top 200 non-U.S. banks worldwide that have adopted IFRS. The reason this study 
chooses non-U.S. banks is to investigate any institutional factors that may influence 
the predictability of earnings for future cash flows and future earnings. Previous 
studies mainly focus on U.S. banks because of the data availability. Studying 
international banks contributes to the existing literature on international accounting 
standards adoption.  
All entities are mandatorily required to disclose the fair value hierarchy for their 
fair value measurements under the IFRS 7 - Financial Instruments: Disclosure. This 
study focuses only on the banking industry for the following reasons. Banks normally 
have significant amounts of fair value assets and liabilities to which IFRS 7 disclosure 
requirements are applicable. As well, bank’s fair value measurements are usually 
more homogeneous than firms in other industries. Thus, the fair value estimations and 
fair value hierarchy classification choices can have a substantial direct impact on 
banks’ earnings and their regulatory capital adequacy. In this study, the largest 200 
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non-U.S. banks are chosen which offers the power to test the hypotheses. Fair value 
hierarchy disclosure requirements under IFRS 7 are effective for banks from the 1
st
 
January, 2009. Therefore, the sample period for this study starts from 2009 until the 
end of 2012 inclusive
9
.  
All the financial information of the top 200 international (non-U.S.) banks is 
downloaded from the BANKSCOPE database. Two countries (China and Russia) have 
been dropped because the institutional variables are not available. The remaining 24 
countries are retained for the earnings persistence and cash flow predictability tests. 
These include Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Singapore, Taiwan and South Africa. Each 
bank’s annual IFRS 7 disclosure information for 2009-2012 is hand-collected from 
their annual reports. Then, bank-year observations with missing values for any of the 
test variables have been excluded. Finally, observations that fall in the top and bottom 
1 percent of variables have been eliminated. The finial sample for tests consists of 552 
bank-year observations associated with 138 unique banks from 24 countries. The 
sample selection procedure is outlined in Panel A of Table 1 while Panel B shows the 
sample banks by country. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in models. The mean 
annual one year ahead future operating cash flow (CFt+1) amounts to 0.8% of total 
assets whereas the mean annual one year ahead earnings before taxes (EBTt+1) is 
approximately 0.4% of total assets. The mean value of fair value exposure (FVEt) is 
0.10 suggesting that as a ratio of total assets, on average approximately 10 percent of 
                                                             
9 In order to test the explanatory power for at least one-year-ahead cash flows and earnings, 
observations in 2013 are used as a dependent variable only. 
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financial instruments are reported at fair value.  
Table 2 also shows that fair value amounts under Level 1 inputs account for most 
fair values. Specifically, on average approximately 7 percent of fair valued financial 
instruments are classified as Level 1 as a ratio of total assets. Whereas, only 2 percent 
and 1 percent of fair valued financial instruments are based on Level 2 and Level 3 
inputs. The relatively smaller mean of 0.01 for Level 3 compared with the standard 
deviation (7.2%) shows that there is substantial variation in Level 3 across banks and over 
the years. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 represents a summary of institutional characteristics of sample banks. Eight 
sample countries are common law countries (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, UK, 
Ireland, Singapore, Malaysia and South Africa) whereas 16 use a code law legal 
system. In order to test our third hypothesis, we divide our sample banks into two 
clusters according to Leuz et al. (2003)
10
. As indicated in Table 3, all countries in the 
ﬁrst cluster have a common-law tradition except Norway. Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
Singapore in this cluster were formerly under British rule and have inherited parts of 
the Anglo-Saxon institutional framework. Leuz et al. (2003) named the ﬁrst cluster as 
‘outsider economy’ that is characterized by large stock markets, low ownership 
concentration, extensive outsider rights, high disclosure, and strong legal 
enforcement.  
In the second cluster, all countries have a code-law tradition with the exception of 
Ireland and South Africa. This cluster consists of the Northern European, 
Scandinavian and several Asian countries. The second cluster show significantly 
smaller stock markets, higher ownership concentration, weaker investor protection, 
lower disclosure levels, and weaker enforcement, which is referred to as ‘insider 
economy’ (Leuz et al., 2003). 
                                                             
10
 Leuz et al. (2003) performed the cluster analysis based on nine institutional variables from La Porta 
et al. (1997, 1998). The variables are standardised to z-scores and then a k-means cluster analysis is 
conducted. 
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[Insert Table 3] 
 
5.2 Fair value accounting and predictability of future earnings and future cash flows  
Table 4 reports the regression results to test hypotheses 1a and 1b regarding the 
association between fair value exposure and the ability of current earnings (EBTt) to 
predict future earnings (EBTt+1) and future cash flows (CFt+1) respectively. Model 1 
shows that EBTt+1 is positively and significantly associated with current EBTt at the 
1% level (coefficient =0.272, t-stat =4.42, p =0.000), consistent with the results 
reported in prior studies (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010). The coefficient of interest for 
the test of hypothesis 1(a) is the interaction variable between fair value exposure and 
current year earnings (FVEt*EBTt). The coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level (coefficient = 0.924, t-stat= 2.44, p = 0.016). Therefore, 
hypothesis 1a in the null form is rejected. That is, the proportion of financial 
instruments that are measured at fair value enhances the ability of earnings to predict 
one year ahead earnings. 
Model (2) in Table 4 shows that current year earnings (EBTt) are predictive of 
future cash flows and the result is statistically significant at the 1% level (coefficient 
=0.475, t-stat= 4.86, p = 0.000). Also, the coefficient on the variable of interest, 
FVEt*EBTt, is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level (coefficient=1.805, 
t-stat=2.18, p = 0.031), suggesting that current year earnings based on a more fair 
value-oriented accounting system are more predictive of one year ahead cash flows.  
This result enables us to reject hypothesis 1b. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that increased exposure to fair 
values in financial reporting enhances the ability of earnings to predict future earnings 
and cash flows. Specifically, after controlling for current period pre-tax earnings, the 
proportion of banks’ financial instruments at fair value has a positive moderating 
effect on the predictive ability of current earnings. 
[Insert Table 4] 
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5.3 The predictive ability of alternative fair value measurement inputs 
Next, we examine the impact of fair value hierarchy classification choices on the 
ability of earnings to predict future cash flows and future earnings. More precisely, we 
investigate if the usefulness of fair values in improving the predictive ability of 
earnings is distinct between the non-discretionary fair value component (Level 1 
assets) and the discretionary fair value components (Level 2 and Level 3 assets). 
Results for models (3) and (4) are reported in Table 5. Again, results continue to show 
that current year pre-tax earnings are associated with future earnings (coefficient= 
0.240, t-stat = 3.93, p = 0.000) and future cash flows (coefficient=0.608, t-stat=6.55, p 
= 0.000).  
Model (3) in Table 5 shows that L1*EBT has a positive and statistically significant 
association with one-year ahead earnings (coefficient t= 0.650, t-stat = 3.15, p = 
0.002). However, the coefficient on L23*EBT is statistically significant and negative 
(coefficient = -1.12, t-stat = -3.49, p = 0.001). Similarly, model (4) in Table 5 reports 
that the coefficient on L1*EBT is statistically significant and positive (coefficient = 
0.373, t-stat = 2.69, p = 0.008) while that on L23*EBT is statistically significant and 
negative (coefficient = -0.868, t-stat = -3.91, p = 0.000). The results reported in this 
section suggest that net Level 1 assets enhance earnings persistence and the ability of 
current earnings to predict future cash flows measured one year ahead. Whereas, 
discretionary fair values based on managerial assumptions (net Level 2 and net Level 
3 assets) are found to weaken the predictive power of current earnings with respect to 
future earnings/cash flows. These results are consistent with our prediction that 
measurement error and management bias contained in discretionary fair values 
measurements (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) can constrain the ability to predict future 
operating performance (Landsman, 2007; Barth, 2006). Hypotheses 2a and 2b are 
therefore supported. 
[Insert Table 5] 
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5.4 The impact of institutional structures on the predictive ability of discretionary fair 
values 
Previous studies provide evidence that the strength of the institutional structures 
across countries can constrain earnings management behaviours and enhance financial 
reporting transparency (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Shen and 
Chih, 2005). Since Level 2 and Level 3 assets are subjectively determined by 
managers, we investigate if the predictability of such assets is distinct dependent on 
the strength of institutional structures. We repeat the analysis from models (3) and (4) 
with sub-samples partitioned into two clusters according to Leuz et al. (2003). The 
results are presented in Table 6.  
We continue to find that current year pre-tax earnings are associated with future 
earnings and future cash flows. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results from the 
analysis of the impact of institutional structures on the ability of discretionary fair 
values to predict future earnings (model 3). The results for Cluster 1 show that 
discretionary fair values (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) improve the ability of current 
earnings to predict future earnings (coefficient on L23*EBT is 0.539, t-stat=2.17, p = 
0.035) when sample banks operate in an ‘outsider economy’ which is characterised by 
large stock markets, low ownership concentration, extensive outsider rights, high 
disclosure, and strong legal enforcement. However, results for cluster 2 show that 
discretionary fair values (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) weaken the ability of current 
earnings to predict future earnings (coefficient on L23*EBT is -1.819, t-stat=-5.32, p 
= 0.000) when sample banks operate in countries with markedly smaller stock 
markets, higher ownership concentration, weaker investor protection, lower disclosure 
levels, and weaker enforcement. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results from the analysis of the impact of 
institutional structures on the ability of discretionary fair values to predict future cash 
flows. The results are similar as those reported in Panel A. Results for Cluster 1 show 
that discretionary fair values (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) improve the ability of 
current earnings to predict future earnings (coefficient on L23*EBT = 0.520, 
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t-stat=2.05, p = 0.046) when sample banks operate in an ‘outsider economy’. Results 
for Cluster 2 continue to show that discretionary fair values (Level 2 and Level 3 
assets) weaken the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings (coefficient on 
L23*EBT = -0.567, t-stat=-1.81, p = 0.073) when sample banks operate in countries 
with comparatively poorer institutional structures. 
In summary, the results reported in Table 6 support the argument that countries 
with strong investor protection (for example, ‘outsider economy’) can help to limit 
insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to 
mask firm performance. Strong institutional structures also help to increase the 
transparency and reliability of discretionary fair values (Level 2 and Level 3 assets), 
which in turn enhances the earnings persistence and cash flow predictability. The 
results are also consistent with the argument that when institutional structures are 
weak (for example, ‘insider economy’), manager may use their discretion with respect 
to fair values to manipulate earnings, making the current earnings a poor predictor of 
future operating performance. Therefore, the coefficient on L23*EBT becomes 
negative when institutional structures are weak. 
 
5.5 Robustness tests 
We perform a number of additional tests to provide robustness to the main results. 
First, following Song et al. (2010), we test whether the results could be confounded 
by bank size (measured as nature logarithm of total assets) and Tier 1 capital ratio 
(downloaded from the Bankscope). We add these two characteristics as separate 
independent variables in the regressions. We continue to reach the same conclusions, 
indicating that results are not driven by differences in bank size or capital ratio. 
Second, following Song et al. (2010), we test whether the bank’s growth factor alters 
the results. Specifically, we control for ‘growth in total assets’ and ‘growth in total 
loans’ and results remain unchanged. Third, to ensure that smaller countries with 
fewer observations do not drive the results, our models have been re-estimated 
excluding those having only four or eight bank-year observations. The results are 
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similar to the results reported in all tables, both in terms of the sign of the coefficients 
and their statistical significance. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Based on a sample of international (non-U.S.) banks from 24 countries during 
2009-2012, we test whether the increasing use of fair values in current financial 
reporting enhances earnings persistence and ability of earnings to predict future cash 
flows. We find that the increasing use of fair values for balance-sheet financial 
instruments enhances the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings and 
cash flows. Furthermore, we provide evidence that fair value hierarchy classification 
choices affect the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows and future earnings. 
More precisely, we find that the non-discretionary fair value component (Level 1 
assets) improves the predictability of current earnings whereas the discretionary fair 
value components (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) weaken the predictive power of 
earnings. In addition, we find a consistent and strong association between factors 
reflecting country-wide institutional structures and predictive power of fair values 
based on discretionary measurement inputs (Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities). 
Specifically, strong institutional structures help to increase the transparency and 
reliability of discretionary fair values (Level 2 and Level 3 assets), which in return 
enhances the earnings persistence and cash flow predictability.  
Our research is timely and relevant. As a result of the recent banking crisis, 
particular emphasis has been placed on fair value based accounting systems. The 
current debate on the use of fair value accounting focuses on potentially increased 
relevance (see Barth, 1994; Petroni and Wahlen, 1995; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et 
al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; Carroll et al., 2003; Schrand, 1997; Venkatachalam, 1996; 
Barth, 1991; Amir, 1993) weighed against issues of reliability. However, it has failed 
to consider the potential impact on the predictive objective of accounting.  
Our findings have important implications for standard setters and contribute to the 
debate on the use of fair value accounting. Our research results support claims by the 
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FASB and the IASB that fair value accounting meets the objectives of financial 
reporting by providing decision-useful information. That is, the use of fair value helps 
in the prediction of earnings and an assessment of the amounts, timing and 
uncertainty of future cash flows. However, we also show that the predictive power of 
fair values is dependent on their reliability (for example, Level 1 versus Level 2/Level 
3 assets). Moreover, we provide evidence that institutional factors play an essential 
role in enhancing the reliability of discretionary fair value estimates which in return 
increases the informativeness of those accounting information. 
We acknowledge that our study has some limitations. For example, it we focus on 
top non-U.S. banks which are larger and have better performance than smaller banks. 
Thus our results may not be generalisable to smaller banks or to banks in the U.S. 
Also, care should be exercised in generalising our findings to firms beyond the 
banking industry. Extending our study to a larger sample of banks of differing sizes 
and to firms in other sectors are important avenues for future research.  
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Table 1  
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 
Original Sample ( bank-year observations) 1000 
Less:  
Missing values on dependent and independent variables 
Missing institutional variables 
380 
40 
Top and bottom 1% of control variables 28 
Number of observations used in the tests 552 
Table 1(a) presents the sample selection procedures. 
 
Panel B: Sample banks by country 
 
Country Bank Bank-Year 
Austria 4 8 
Australia 7 28 
Belgium 6 24 
Brazil 2 8 
Canada 5 20 
Chile 3 12 
Germany 18 72 
Denmark 1 4 
Spain 6 24 
Finland 1 4 
France 17 68 
UK 19 76 
Greece 2 8 
Hong Kong 7 28 
Ireland 2 8 
Italy 10 40 
South Korea 7 28 
Malaysia 2 8 
Netherlands 6 24 
Norway 4 16 
Sweden 2 10 
Singapore 4 16 
Taiwan 1 4 
South Africa 3 12 
TOTAL 138 552 
Table 1(b) presents the sample distributions by country. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for earnings persistence and cash flow 
predictability tests 
 
Variable N Mean Stand. 
Dev. 
1
st
 
Quartile 
Median 3
rd
  
Quartile 
EBTt+1 552 0.004 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.009 
CFt+1 552 0.008 0.013 0.004 0.008 0.013 
EBTt 552 0.004 0.015 0.001 0.004 0.010 
FVEt 552 0.100 0.170 0.020 0.070 0.150 
L1  552 0.070 0.136 0.009 0.045 0.096 
L2  552 0.020 0.118 0.002 0.008 0.039 
L3  552 0.010 0.072 0.000 0.002 0.006 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of test variables. The full sample consists of 552 bank-year 
observations for the fiscal years 2009 to 2013 across 24 countries. Financial accounting information is 
obtained from the Bankscope Database. Fair value measurement hierarchy information is 
hand-collected from the annual reports. EBTt+1 is measured as earnings before taxes during the year t+1 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. CFt+1 is calculated as earnings before taxes and the 
loan loss provisions during the year t+1 scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. EBTt is 
earnings before taxes scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. FVEt is calculated as the total 
fair valued financial instruments over total assets; L1, L2 and L3 are calculated as net Level 1, net 
Level 2 and net Level 3 assets divided by total assets, respectively.
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Table 3: Summary of institutional characteristics of sample banks 
Country 
Legal 
Religion 
Legal 
Tradition 
Outside 
Investor 
Rights 
Legal 
Enforcement 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Important of Equity 
Market 
Disclosure Index 
Cluster 1 
Australia English Common  4 9.3 0.28 24 75 
Canada English Common 5 9.58 0.24 23.3 74 
UK English Common 5 9.4 0.15 25 78 
Hong Kong English Common 5 8.77 0.54 28.8 69 
Malaysia English Common 4 7.71 0.52 25.3 76 
Norway Scandinavian Code 3 9.76 0.31 20.3 74 
Singapore English  Common 4 8.99 0.53 28.8 78 
Cluster 2 
Austria German Code 2 9.47 0.51 7 54 
Belgium French Code 0 9.49 0.62 11.3 61 
Brazil French Code 3 6.52 NA 16.3 54 
Chile French Code 5 6.77 NA NA 52 
Germany German Code 1 9.37 0.5 5 62 
Denmark Scandinavian Code 2 9.8 0.4 20 62 
Spain French Code 4 7.87 0.5 7.2 64 
Finland Scandinavian Code 3 9.8 0.34 13.7 77 
France French Code 3 8.97 0.24 9.3 69 
Greece French Code 2 6.84 0.68 11.5 55 
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Ireland English Common 4 8.74 0.36 17.3 NA 
Italy French Code 1 7.95 0.6 6.5 62 
South Korea German Code 2 6.71 0.2 11.7 62 
Netherlands French Code 2 9.87 0.31 19.3 64 
Sweden Scandinavian Code 4 9.92 0.28 16.7 83 
Taiwan German Code 3 8.08 0.14 13.3 65 
South Africa English Common 5 6.7 0.52 16.3 70 
Table 3 presents a summary of institutional characteristics of sample banks. The classification of the Legal Origin and the Legal Tradition are based on La Porta et al., (1998). 
Code (Common) indicates a code-law (common-law) country. The Outside Investor Rights variable is the anti-director rights index created by La Porta et al. (1998); it is an 
aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from zero to five. Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta 
et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to ten. Ownership 
Concentration is measured as the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms (La 
Porta et al., 1998). The Importance of Equity Market is measured by the mean rank across three variables used in La Porta et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock 
market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the 
population. Each variable is ranked such that higher scores indicate a greater importance of the stock market. The Disclosure Index measures the inclusion or omission of 90 
items in the 1990 annual reports (La Porta et al., 1998); NA: it is not available in our sample. 
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Table 4: Predictability of future earnings and future cash flows based on the level of financial instruments reported at fair value 
  Model (1)  Model (2) 
Independent  Earnings (EBTt+1)  Cash Flows (CFt+1) 
Variable 
Predicted Sign Coefficient* 
(p-value) 
T-stat  
Coefficient* 
(p-value) 
T-stat 
Intercept 
 0.009*** 
(0.000) 
6.10  
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
6.18 
EBT 
+ 0.272*** 
(0.000) 
4.42  
0.475*** 
(0.000) 
4.86 
FV 
+/- -0.012 
(0.122) 
-1.55  
-0.017** 
(0.000) 
-2.25 
FV*EBT 
 
+ 
0.924** 
(0.016) 
2.44  
1.805** 
(0.031) 
 
2.18 
Year dummy  Yes   Yes  
Country dummy  Yes   Yes  
Observations 
 
 
552   552  
Adj. R
2 
 56.53%   71.37%  
Table 4 presents the regressing results for models (1) and (2).  
EBTt+1 is measured as earnings before taxes during the year t+1 scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. CFt+1 is calculated as earnings before taxes and the loan 
loss provisions during the year t+1 scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. EBTt is earnings before taxes scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. FVEt is 
calculated as the total fair valued financial instruments over total assets; FV*EBT is an interaction variable of FVE and EBT. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, or 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Predictability of future earnings and future cash flows from alternative fair value measurement inputs 
Independent  
Model (3) 
Earnings (EBTt+1) 
 
Model (4) 
Cash Flows (CFt+1) 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coefficient* 
(P value) 
T-stat  
Coefficient* 
(P value) 
T-stat 
Intercept  
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
7.39  
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
6.95 
EBT + 
0.240*** 
(0.000) 
3.93  
0.608*** 
(0.000) 
6.55 
L1 +/- 
-0.004 
(0.255) 
-1.14  
-0.007*** 
(0.262) 
-1.13 
L23 +/- 
0.007*** 
(0.395) 
0.85  
0.004*** 
(0.574) 
0.56 
L1*EBT + 
0.650*** 
(0.002) 
3.15  
0.373*** 
(0.008) 
2.69  
L23*EBT - 
-1.12*** 
(0.001) 
-3.49  
-0.868*** 
(0.000) 
-3.91  
Year dummy  Yes   Yes   
Country dummy  Yes   Yes  
Observations  552   552  
Adj. R
2 
 64.5%   55.6%  
Table 5 presents the regressing results for models (3) and (4). 
EBTt+1 L1 is calculated as net Level 1 assets divided by total assets; L23 is calculated as the sum of net Level 2 and net Level 3 divided by total assets. Other variables are as 
defined in Table 4. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, or 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 6  
Panel A: The impact of institutional structures on the ability of discretionary fair values to predict future earnings (Model 3) 
 
  Cluster 1 (Outsider economy)   Cluster 2 (Insider economy) 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted Sign 
Coefficient* 
(p-value) 
T-stat  
Coefficient* 
(p-value) 
T-stat 
Intercept  
0.011 
(0.000) 
5.337  
0.002 
(0.212) 
1.26 
EBT + 
0.101 
(0.130) 
1.54  
0.199** 
(0.015) 
2.48 
L1 +/- 
-0.016* 
(0.095) 
-1.70  
-0.001 
(0.888) 
-0.14 
L23 +/- 
-0.006 
(0.500) 
-0.68  
0.015** 
(0.027) 
2.25 
L1*EBT +/- 
0.243** 
(0.033) 
2.19  
0.697** 
(0.015) 
2.48 
L23*EBT +/- 
0.539** 
(0.035) 
2.17  
-1.819*** 
(0.000) 
-5.32 
Year dummy  Yes   Yes  
Country dummy  Yes   Yes  
Observations  210   342  
Adj. R  66.8%   68.7%  
Variables as defined in Tables 4 and 5. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, or 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Panel B: The impact of institutional structures on the ability of discretionary fair values to predict future cash flows (Model 4) 
 
  Cluster 1 (Outsider economy)  Cluster 2 (Insider economy) 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted Sign 
Coefficient* 
(p-value) 
T-stat  
Coefficient* 
(p-value) 
T-stat 
Intercept  
0.013*** 
(0.000)  
9.73  
0.012*** 
(0.000)  
3.79  
EBT + 
0.036 
(0.664)  
0.44  
0.604** 
(0.000) 
5.55  
L1 +/- 
0.006 
(0.403) 
0.84  
-0.020** 
(0.047)  
-2.01 
L23 +/- 
0.018 
(0.001) 
3.60  
-0.020* 
(0.072)  
-1.82 
L1*EBT +/- 
0.248*** 
(0.010) 
2.69   
1.377*** 
(0.010)  
2.49  
L23*EBT +/- 
0.520** 
(0.046) 
2.05   
-0.567* 
(0.073)  
-1.81 
Year dummy  Yes   Yes  
Country dummy  Yes   Yes  
Observations  210   342  
Adj. R  75.4%%   74.5%%  
Variables as defined in Tables 4 and 5. 
 ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, or 10 % level, respectively. 
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